The analytical framework for identifying and benchmarking systemically important financial institutions in Europe by Karkowska, Renata
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The analytical framework for identifying
and benchmarking systemically
important financial institutions in Europe
Renata Karkowska
University of Warsaw
September 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58819/
MPRA Paper No. 58819, posted 25. September 2014 02:35 UTC
Faculty of Management Working Paper Series 4/ 2014 
1 
 
 
 
UW Faculty of Management 
Working Paper Series 
No 4 / September 2014 
 
 
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR IDENTIFYING 
AND BENCHMARKING SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE 
  
Renata Karkowska 
University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management  
Poland 
rkarkowska@wz.uw.edu.pl 
  
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: C1, F36, F65, G21, G32, G33 
Keywords: banking, Systematically Important Financial Institutions, SIFI,  
systemic risk, liquidity, leverage, profitability 
 
 
 
Faculty of Management Working Paper Series 4/ 2014 
2 
 
 
 
UW FM  Working Paper Series are written by researchers employed at  the Faculty of Management of 
UW  and by other economists, and are published by the Faculty.  
DISCLAIMER: An objective of the series is to get the research results out quickly, even if 
their presentations are not fully polished. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions 
expressed in this Working Paper are those of their author(s) and do not necessarily the views 
of the Faculty of Management of UW. 
 
© By the Author(s). The papers are written by the authors and should be cited accordingly. 
 
 
  
Publisher: University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management  Press 
Address: 
Str.: Szturmowa 1/3; 02-678 Warsaw, Poland 
Telephone: +48 22 55 34 164 
Fax: +48 22 55 34 001 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from: 
http://www.wz.uw.edu.pl/serwisy,witryna,1,dzial,326.html 
Information on all of the papers published in the UW Faculty of Management Working Paper 
Series can be found on Faculty of Management Website  at: 
http://www.wz.uw.edu.pl/serwisy,witryna,1,dzial,326.html 
 
 
ISSN 2300-4371 (ONLINE)                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Faculty of Management Working Paper Series 4/ 2014 
3 
 
 
 
The Analytical Framework For Identifying  
And Benchmarking Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions In Europe 
  
Renata Karkowska1 
University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management  
Poland 
rkarkowska@wz.uw.edu.pl 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this article is to identify systemically important banks on a European scale, in accordance 
with the criteria proposed by the supervisory authorities. In this study we discuss the analytical 
framework for identifying and benchmarking systemically important financial institutions. An attempt 
to define systemically important institutions is specified their characteristics under the existing and 
proposed regulations. In a selected group of the largest banks in Europe the following indicators ie.: 
leverage, liquidity, capital ratio, asset quality and profitability are analyzed as a source of systemic 
risk. These figures will be confronted with the average value obtained in the whole group of 
commercial banks in Europe. It should help finding the answer to the question, whether the size of the 
institution generates higher systemic risk? The survey will be conducted on the basis of the financial 
statements of commercial banks in 2007 and 2010 with the available statistical tools, which should 
reveal the variability of risk indicators over time. We find that the largest European banks were 
characterized by relative safety and without excessive risk in their activities. Therefore, a fundamental 
feature of increased regulatory limiting systemic risk should understand the nature and sources of 
instability, and mobilizing financial institutions (large and small) to change their risk profile and 
business models in a way that reduces the instability of the financial system globally. 
JEL classification: C1, F36, F65, G21, G32, G33 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Crisis of 2007-2008 revealed a serious lack of information on the size and condition of the financial 
markets and institutions at the sector level. It turned out that the supervisory authorities do not have 
sufficient sources to identify global markets and mega financial institutions of systemic importance - 
Systematically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI’s). Determination of systemically important 
institutions has become a priority of regulatory authorities, but the problem turned out to be more 
difficult than previously thought. Statements of practitioners and academics present position, that the 
amount of the assets is not the only prerequisite for systemically important institutions category. 
Cooperation between the Financial Stability Board, Committee on the Global Financial System, Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, the Committee of Payment and Settlement Systems aimed to 
identify global systemically important institutions, and thereby reduce systemic risk. 
Given the above, the study is to compare the risks taken in the largest banks (in terms of total 
assets) out of the other banks in Europe. The study was put hypothesis that the risk taken by 
the largest banks in Europe is not higher than in other banks. Therefore, we should pay special 
attention to look at smaller banks, which dealing as the group may contribute much more to 
the instability of banking sector. More important will be the risk of SIFI’s substitutability of 
their services and international relations, in the light of the potential danger of bankruptcy of 
one of the largest banks. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present SIFI definition and 
terminology. In section 3 we show research methodology. In section 4 we calculate risk ratio 
for the largest banks in Europe. In section 5, we discus results. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2 CONCEPT AND ROLE OF SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT NSTITUTIONS 
From the point of view of present analysis it seems important issue of the definition of systemically 
important banks. In recent years the doctrine of the bank "too big to fail" is based on the belief that 
some banks because of their size and importance of the financial sector should be funded in the event 
of risk of bankruptcy. This is due to the belief that the collapse of one bank could cause serious 
disturbances in the functioning of the financial system. The existence of an institution whose activities 
have a significant share in the domestic or international market, means that any disruption of the 
functioning of the entity prevents proper functioning of other entities. What in the further 
consequently cause accumulation of systemic risks and problems with public finances of countries. 
The reason for the introduction of the above-mentioned categories of mega-institutions are: 
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 phenomenon of financialisation of the economy, ie separation of rotation of cash 
transactions from material goods and services markets within the meaning of real 
economic transactions, 
 risks generated by Too Big to Fail (TBTF) institutions. 
 
Until September 2008, the general principle of Too Big To Fail was valid in relation to global capital 
groups - too big to fail, or to be able to finance its liquidation. The costs of bankruptcy systemically 
important institutions are so heavy that they can not be covered by public finance of home,or host 
country.  
The concept of systemically important institutions established in the course of deliberations on 
identifying the situation when and what kind of financial institution may lead to the materialisation of 
systemic risk. Mega-institutions have such a large network of connections that bankruptcy would 
cause significant disturbance of the whole financial system. 
A proposal for the concept of systemically important institutions is presented in Table 1 Weistroffer 
(2011). 
Table 1 The size of the concept of systemically important financial institutions 
Size Contributing to systemic risk Participation in the transmission 
disturbances 
The systemic significance Marginal part in the disturbances, 
controlled bankruptcy. 
Expected participation of 
institutions in the realization of 
systemic risk; losses for the bank's 
customers. 
Risk measures - the share of interbank liabilities,  
- liquidity and maturity of assets,  
- the effect of transmission of 
contagion risk volatility of asset 
prices in different markets. 
- correlation in assets value, 
- leverage, 
- risk absorption capacity. 
Macroprudential Policy - taking into account the costs of 
bankruptcy, 
- avoiding moral hazard behavior. 
The ability to survive of system 
events. 
Source: own study based on Weistroffer (2011). 
 
Systemically important institutions are those whose effects can have negative effects on the 
functioning of the financial system on an international scale. 
2.1 Criteria for the classification and categories of systemically important 
institutions 
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Given the lack of clear definition of systemically important institutions is considered the market 
benchmark, as a quantification of the size might indicate the existence of systemic risk. It seems that 
these indicators should be fairly stable in the face of daily market volatility, and be an utilization to the 
long term strategy. At the same time encourage the boards to the use of prudential norms and do not 
take steps manipulation.  
According to the literature and guidelines Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) basic indicators, indicating danger to systemic 
risk, can be identified based on the following criteria: 
 size (the total value of the position calculated for the purposes of the leverage 
ratio under Basel III in relation to the total of the items),  
 international links (the sum of receivables/liabilities from financial institutions 
relative to total receivables from financial institutions of all banks), 
 degree of substitutability of services and infrastructure (the value of assets that the 
bank holds in custody as depositary with respect to their values for all banks 
included in the study),  
 complexity (nominal value of derivative transactions with OTC,  
  the value of assets in the trading book), 
 transjurisdictional activity – foreign receivables/liabilities to the claims of all  
banks included in the survey (BIS, 2011, s. 4-10).  
The methodology involves the use of 20% by weight for each of the indicators. 
 
The size of Sistematicaly Important Financial Institutions 
Frequently as a measure of determining the meaning of the mega-institution adopts the size of assets, 
equity, and market turnover. However, in the course of research on systemic risk criterion of the 
institution gives way to the interrelation of entities, the liquidity gap, or the size of the leverage against 
the entity (Karkowska, 2012). According to the typology adopted by the ECB as large banks are 
referred to those which are asset size greater than 0.5% of the consolidated total assets of the banks of 
the European Union. Table 2 provides a summary of the banks in Europe (from the group of the 100 
largest banks in the world according to BIS), in which the share of assets in relation to gross domestic 
product is the greatest. This means that in other countries there is no banking institution in such 
Faculty of Management Working Paper Series 4/ 2014 
8 
 
serious dimensions. It should be noted that in all these countries the share of large banks is more than 
half the assets of the banking system, which in the context of systemic risk can be an important source 
of risk. This statement also reflects the strong processes of consolidation of the banking system in 
developed countries of Europe and the dominance of large institutions. Nearly 30% of the total 
number of banks in each of the analyzed developed countries are capital banking groups (see Table 2). 
Descriptive statistics for a selected group of the largest banks in Europe are presented in Appendix 1. 
Table 2 Statement of the largest banks in Europe (from the group of the 100 largest banks in the 
world): the value of assets in the domestic banking system and GDP. Geographical breakdown, as 
of the second quarter of 2012. 
Lp Bank Kraj 
Aktywa (bln 
USD) 
Aktywa (% 
krajowych 
aktywów 
bank.)   
Aktywa (% 
udział PKB 
kraju) 
1 Deutsche Bank Germany 2822 76.9 81.1 
2 HSBC  UK 2652 27.8 108.1 
3 Barclays UK 2545 26.7 103.8 
4 BNP Paribas France 248 39.3 91.5 
5 Crédit Agricole S.A. France 2269 35.9 83.7 
6 Royal Bank of Scotland Group UK 2208 23.2 90.0 
7 Banco Santander S.A. Spain 1627 50.7 116.4 
8 Société Générale France 157 24.8 57.9 
9 ING Netherlands 1558 90.2 194.2 
10 Lloyds Banking Group UK 15 15.7 61.2 
11 UBS Switzerland 1478 57.5 238.0 
12 UniCredit Italy 1202 45.0 58.2 
13 Credit Suisse Group Switzerland 1092 42.5 175.9 
14 Nordea Bank Sweden 892 47.9 162.4 
15 Commerzbank Germany 847 23.1 24.3 
16 Intesa Sanpaolo Italy 839 31.4 40.6 
17 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. Spain 784 24.4 56.1 
18 Standard Chartered UK 624 6.6 25.5 
19 Danske Bank Denmark 590 100.0 183.6 
20 Dexia Belgium 518 59.0 104.2 
21 DnB ASA Norway 397 100.0 79.1 
22 Bankia S.A. Spain 392 12.2 28.0 
23 Svenska Handelsbanken Sweden 365 19.6 66.5 
24 KBC Belgium 360 41.0 72.4 
25 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken Sweden 341 18.3 62.0 
26 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena Italy 292 10.9 14.1 
27 Erste Group Bank Austria 271 58.5 66.1 
28 Swedbank Sweden 263 14.1 47.9 
29 Banco de Sabadell S.A. Spain 210 6.5 15.0 
30 Banco Popular Espanol S.A. Spain 199 6.2 14.3 
31 Bank of Ireland Ireland 199 54.9 94.8 
32 Raiffeisen Bank International Austria 192 41.5 46.9 
33 SNS Reaal Netherlands 169 9.8 21.1 
34 Banco Popolare Italy 168 6.3 8.1 
35 UBI Banca Italy 168 6.3 8.1 
36 Allied Irish Banks Plc Ireland 163 45.1 78.0 
Source: own study based on BIS database 
 
This is the approach of Financial Stability Board and the Bank for International Settlements, annually 
updating statistics 100 largest banks in the world. For comparative scale of the phenomenon, these 
values are presented in the form of the indicator, relative to GDP, or market capitalization. 
Undoubtedly, the size of the institution is an important factor generated systemic risk, but not the most 
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important. Bankruptcy larger institutions causes higher losses in scale economies than less. In other 
words, the larger the institution in terms of assets, capitalization, etc.., ceteris paribus, the stronger the 
impact of systemic risk. On the other hand, it should be considered whether limiting the size of 
financial entities, will serve the security of the financial system. Empirical research on whether the 
costs of maintaining a large financial institution outweigh the benefits of economies of scale, are 
varied. And the impact of the size of the entity on its share of systemic risk in the world seems to be 
still unresolved and require further research. 
International links 
Interconnectedness of financial institutions is generally measured by share of assets and liabilities in 
the system of intra-system, for example. Value of the credit exposure of the institution to the rest of 
the system and its contribution to systemic risk. What is the contribution of credit risk to the rest of the 
system, and thus the potential involvement of the institution in the systemic event. The Basel 
Committee also proposes to use the interbank funding rate, ie. share of the funding coming from 
sources other than retail deposits in total liabilities. They also reflect claims and liabilities in the 
interbank financial markets and the allocation of credit risk between financial institutions. Due to the 
allocation / risk diversification and liquidity interconnectedness can bring benefits to the diverse 
structure of the financial system.  
The substitutability of services and infrastructure 
Substitutability of the financial institution is particularly difficult to measure. It should not be wrongly 
identified with market dominance. Although the Basel Committee proposes the use of the indicator 
complex assets under custody, whether the payments settled through payment systems, but it would be 
more appropriate analysis of scenarios and the likelihood that an institution may exit the of the market 
and no longer offer their services. Measurement of substitutability of services in this way requires (a) a 
consistent definition of what constitutes a market system, and (b) of the definition of the market share 
of systemic importance. 
In the assessment of substitutability should not be limited to financial intermediaries, but also to 
markets, or payment systems, which can play an important systemic role at the national level or 
international level, in the financial system and the whole economy (FSB et al, 2009, p. 2). The author's 
research suggests that the cause of systemic disorders may be, for example, repo market, intensively 
developing since the security deposits requirement in derivative transactions. Supervisors have a 
strong basis in supporting the smooth functioning and flexibility of the market. During the crisis, it 
turned out that the infrastructure transaction settlement had basic flaws that could lead to serious 
instability in times of market stress (Karkowska, 2013). An example the above is the bankruptcy of 
Bear Stearns, which is the main subject of clearing the repo market. The bankruptcy of the entity 
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meant that money market funds instead of money would receive a collateral Bear Stearns, which in the 
absence of the possibility of liquidation would lead to a run on the financial market (Acharya, 
Richardson, 2009, p. 297). 
The complexity of the components of the financial system 
Complexity relates generally to the organizational structure of the institution, but its sources also refer 
to the complex structure of assets. The Basel Committee shall adopt the latter view and measure the 
complexity of the notional value of OTC derivatives, especially those whose valuation is not directly 
observable in the market. Such an approach to measures of complexity based on the assumption that 
the more complicated harder to sell assets and more complex corporate structures are more difficult to 
solve. In both cases, finding appropriate indicators it is rather difficult to determine. 
Transjurisdictional activity (the activity of company on a global scale) 
 
The activity of a global financial institution is generally measured by the level of cross-border 
claims and liabilities. The Basel Committee also proposes as an auxiliary measurement of 
non-domestic revenues. Generally it is assumed that banks conducting its activities globally 
are a particular threat to the stability of the global financial system, in relation to those that are 
active only in the domestic market. Globally active banks are often higher than domestic and 
through foreign financing exposure may result in wider transnational contagion channel 
systemic risk. 
On the other hand, the measurement of the global activity of banks is a typical example of how to 
determine the relevance of systemic institutions should not be used for comparative purposes for the 
regulatory authorities. For the assignment of regulatory burdens for cross-border claims and liabilities 
implies the risk of causing unintended side effects. If, through the regulation of SIFI’s banks globally 
operating will generate higher marginal costs in their cross-border activities, than their local 
competitors, it will be less competitive, automatically. Čihák (2011) and Mayer (2011) argue that 
systemic immunity increases with increasing cross-border linkages, at least to a point. After crossing 
the optimum point, the resistance decreases again until your financial institution does not restore the 
kind of "elasticity". In connection with the sovereign debt crisis in some EU Member States, large 
cross-border institutions could help create a more flexible banking system in the euro area and to 
provide a stable basis for financing. Opinions on the risks arising from the activities of the global 
banks are divided. 
These criteria can not be considered as the only determinants of SIFIs. It should also be 
considered, including gross or net income, market capitalization criteria in the case of size, 
volatility contagion effect (contagion) or correlation valuation of assets. 
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As a systemically important intermediaries can be distinguished also offering payment 
services, risk management, and investment programs. Frequently as single entities may mean 
little, but their lack of substitutability nature may introduce a system in crisis. Brunnermeier 
(2009) introduces the categories of financial institutions in the context of the spread of 
channels disorders: 
 systemically important financial institutions, which because of its size and 
concentration of activity is considered to be dominant in the relevant market 
according the classical doctrine of "too big to fail". 
 large and complex financial institutions, ie. insurance companies or pension funds, 
usually regarded as irrelevant systemic internationally. However, that may have a 
significant economic impact on the economy within national legislation, in the 
event of disruption of business. 
 small size in terms of assets and irrelevant for a single entity, and analyzed in 
terms of groups which may have significant systemic importance, due to the high 
level of correlation of assets and risk taking. An example of this type of category 
SIFI’s are investment funds, ie., cash and hedge funds. 
 small entities, but significant activity conducted financial transactions. An example 
of what can be brokers nationwide. 
On the one hand, the new prudential standards support the safety of banks and the entire 
financial system stability. On the other hand, the new regulations by the fact that impose 
stricter prudential standards for banks hinder their functioning and inhibit the growth of 
banking. They should therefore be made reasonably. 
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
With a view to the selection criteria, specified banks to the rank of systemically important 
institutions, the study was based on the analysis of risk and efficiency indicators in the 
activities of the largest (in terms of total assets to GDP) commercial banks in Europe. For this 
purpose, the research group was selected - 36 commercial banks of the 100 largest banks in 
the world, according to the classification made by the Bank for International Settlements. In 
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turn, in newly appointed group of European banks there was estimated the following 
indicators, ie.: Leverage ratio=Equity/Total Assets, Profitability=Profit before tax/Total 
Assets, Liquidity=Liquid Assets/Deposits, Capital Ratio, Credit Asset Quality=Loan Loss 
Provisions/Total Assets, Loans/Total Assets of bank, as a source of potencial systemic risk 
signals. The results for the 36 largest banks in Europe were compared with the results 
averaged (median indicator) for 3963 banks in Europe, which should help in finding the 
answer to the question, whether in fact the entity size generates a higher risk? The research 
will be conducted on the basis of the financial statements of commercial banks available in 
the Bankscope database, for the period of 2007 and 2010. It should reveal the variability of 
risk indicators over time. The time analysis was chosen because of the comparative activities 
of the largest banks in the time before the crisis (2007) and after the financial crisis (2010). To 
better understand the study, and the effective analysis, the results of the study are presented in 
graphical form. 
3 RESULTS 
Graphical presentation of the analysis of indicators in the activity of the largest banks in 
Europe was done in Figure 1 for 2007 and Figure 2 for 2010. The results for the largest banks 
in Europe have been compiled with averaged results for banks across Europe. Calculations for 
all European banks gave the following results: Leverage Ratio=7.11%, Liquid Assets/Total 
Deposits=16.31%, Capital Funds/Total Assets=7.26%, Loan Loss Provision/Total 
Assets=0.003%, Loans/Total Assets=0.63%, Profit before Tax/Total Assets=0.01%. Detailed 
analysis of risk indicators of excessive debt, liquidity, capital adequacy and effectiveness of 
the largest commercial banks in Europe showed that they take the risk does not differ from the 
average across Europe.  
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Figure 1 Indicator analysis of  the activities of  the largest banks in Europe in 2007. 
Median for all European banks (Lev=7.11; Liq=16.31)
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Notes: The 36 largest banks in Europe. Area of symbol proportional to bank's average assets. Leverage ratio=Equity/Total Assets, Profitability=Profit before 
tax/Total Assets, Liquidity=Liquid Assets/Deposits. The horizontal and vertical line presents median value of particular ratio for all European banks in 2007. 
Source: own calculations based on Bankscope data (2012).
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On the basis of Bankscope database, in most cases the Leverage Ratio for large banks in 
Europe proved to be lower than the average for all European banks. Decreasing trend 
remained despite the crisis from 2008 to 2009. This phenomenon shows that the largest banks 
in Europe do not take excessive risks leverage before the crisis. Similar results were obtained 
for the indicator is Liquid Assets Deposits - the biggest banks have greater resources of liquid 
assets in relation to the accepted deposits than the average bank in Europe. It is difficult to 
indicate excessive exposure to liquidity risk by the largest banks. After a period of crisis, the 
liquidity of the banks also increased, which suggests that banks could have problems with 
liquidity during the crisis. Liquidity transformation and the allocation of credit create system-
wide risk that would also be present in a system without SIFIs. Confronting the liquidity ratio 
of banks to their performance, proved to be the classic principle the lower liquidity, the higher 
the profitability of the bank. The value of the indicator of profitability in 2007 showed 
significant variation to the whole of Europe (see Figure 1), which has been vast change in 
2010 (see Figure 2). The bank's profitability decreased from 0.01 to 0.004. It is also clearly 
visible that the crisis affected the alignment of the profitability ratio and approached the 
profits of the largest banks to the average for the whole of Europe. It is difficult to agree with 
the statement that the largest banks in Europe achieve superior returns by taking excessive 
risk of insolvency or liquidity. It seems that the scale effect does not significantly affect the 
efficiency of the largest banks. Taking into account the profitability of the largest banks in the 
light of their risk of default (expressed in Capital Funds/Total Assets Ratio) can be noted that 
in 2007, the phenomenon is characterized by a great diversity (see Figure 1 left-down Chart). 
The largest banks of the study group had a Capital Ratio below the average in Europe. This 
situation can turn to anxiety due to the risk of insolvency of major financial institutions and 
the security of the entire financial system. It is important that the sample not included banks 
with above-average profitability and low ratio of equity to total assets. It should be noted that 
the threat of insolvency caused by the financial crisis brought no improvement - 2010 little 
changed in scale security banks. An analysis concerning the lending activities of banks 
showed that the largest banks lending to decline in the period 2007-2010 from 63% to 42%. 
Loans Total Assets Ratio is received for the largest banks below the average for the whole of 
Europe. Also noteworthy is the increase in the allowance for risk LLP in both the major banks 
as well as across Europe (see Figure 2, right-upper Chart). 
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Figure 2 Indicator analysis of  the activities of  the largest banks in Europe in 2010. 
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Notes: The 36 largest banks in Europe. Area of symbol proportional to bank's average assets. Leverage ratio=Equity/Total Assets, Profitability=Profit before 
tax/Total Assets, Liquidity=Liquid Assets/Deposits. The horizontal and vertical line presents median value of particular ratio for all European banks in 2010. 
Source: own calculations based on Bankscope data (2012). 
Faculty of Management Working Paper Series No 4/ 2014 
16 
 
In conclusion, the study showed that the risk taken by the largest banks in Europe is not 
higher than in other banks. Therefore, we should pay special attention to look at smaller 
banks, which in the group may contribute to the instability of the sector. By confronting the 
results with the averages for the whole of Europe in terms of liquidity risk, leverage, and 
profitability, these banks were characterized by relative safety. Thus, the more important may 
be the risk of substitutability their services and international relations in the light of the 
potential danger of bankruptcy of one of the largest banks.        
5 CONCLUSIONS 
Given the methodology of the activities undertaken by the Financial Stability Board would doubt the 
legitimacy of providing only the largest banks on SIFI’s lists. It seems economic repercussions of 
system scenarios should also include insurance company, investment and pension funds, or other 
entities, which according to the above categories may be source of systemic risk? Should be consider 
whether the publication of systemically important entities not turn attention of investors and 
supervisors of smaller entities, being able to disrupt the financial system. In the light of this study, the 
risk taken by the largest banks in Europe are not essential as the banking instability indicators. 
The basis of the regulations limiting systemic risk is to understand the nature and sources of 
SIFI instability. The advantage of the methodology developed by the Basel Committee should 
be to mobilize financial institutions to change their risk profile and business models in a way 
that reduces the instability of the financial system globally. A financial institution’s 
contribution to systemic risk is generally reflected in its liabilities to the rest of the system, i.e. 
to other financial institutions, and in its possible impact on asset and credit markets. It thus 
captures how important an institution is for the deposit system and how vulnerable it is to a 
systemic shock. 
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Appendix 1 Indicator analysis of for the activities of the largest banks in Europe in 2007, based on the database Bankscope 
Bank name Country name  Average Assets  
Capital Funds/ Total 
Assets 
Leverage 
Liquid 
Assets/Deposits 
Loans/Total 
Assets 
LLP/Total 
Assets 
Profit before 
Tax/Total Assets 
Deutsche Bank AG GERMANY 2 380 301 056 2,27 1,5 22,45 0,33 0 0 
BNP Paribas FRANCE 1 679 249 920 4,65 2,63 45,65 0,28 0 0 
UBS AG SWITZERLAND 1 414 399 360 2,13 2,13 73,01 0,26 0 0 
Société Générale FRANCE 1 394 032 768 3,45 1,9 32,1 0,25 0 0 
Royal Bank of Scotland UNITED KINGDOM 1 376 651 008 6,59 3,81 26,11 0,4 
 
0,01 
HSBC Bank plc UNITED KINGDOM 849 587 264 6,02 4,9 48,56 0,36 
 
0,01 
Raiffeisen Centrobank AG AUSTRIA 849 587 264 6,51 5,33 20,11 0,06 0 0,02 
ING Bank NETHERLANDS 669 304 384 9,93 5,64 63,08 0,27 
 
0,01 
Crédit Agricole S.A. FRANCE 590 790 528 12,38 6,97 87,15 0 0 0,01 
Lloyds TSB Bank Plc UNITED KINGDOM 527 250 080 7,63 3,51 16,49 0,74 
 
0,01 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA SPAIN 482 156 192 9,64 6,09 45,98 0,59 0 0,01 
Banco Santander SA SPAIN 477 009 120 16,69 8,48 40,39 0,44 0 0,01 
Intesa Sanpaolo ITALY 449 784 192 15,59 12,27 37,46 0,5 0 0 
Danske Bank A/S DENMARK 421 235 200 6,51 4,41 21,3 0,46 0 0,01 
Commerzbank AG GERMANY 418 591 200 6,92 3,68 39,57 0,39 0,01 0 
UniCredit ITALY 341 399 968 22,18 17,39 78,44 0,08 0 0,01 
KBC Bank BELGIUM 296 706 752 7,54 4,1 28,28 0,45 0 0,01 
Allied Irish Banks IRELAND 232 846 304 5,72 3,55 35,6 0,51 
 
0,01 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB SWEDEN 212 935 632 5,04 2,3 30,31 0,43 0 0,01 
Bank of Ireland IRELAND 209 866 688 5,22 2,33 38,77 0,42 
 
0,01 
DNB Bank ASA NORWAY 208 674 624 8,05 5,25 27,72 0,66 0 0,01 
Svenska Handelsbanken SWEDEN 204 869 488 7,39 3,5 29,05 0,52 0 0,01 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena ITALY 167 369 648 9,07 6,27 37,32 0,51 0 0,01 
Standard Chartered Bank UNITED KINGDOM 157 282 496 16,15 8,59 24,22 0,3 
 
0,01 
Swedbank AB SWEDEN 138 467 840 7,41 3,7 46,44 0,36 0 0,01 
Nordea Bank AB SWEDEN 135 370 960 17,77 11,26 52,72 0,28 0 0,01 
Erste Group Bank AG AUSTRIA 128 891 944 12,9 8,04 48,12 0,33 0 0 
Banco Popular Espanol SA SPAIN 108 494 768 6,93 4,69 27,56 0,63 0 0,02 
Dexia Banque Internationale LUXEMBOURG 86 529 216 8,99 3,02 35,48 0,17 0 0 
SNS Bank NETHERLANDS 71 263 064 7,84 4,46 46,73 0,48 
 
0,01 
Barclays Bank S.A. SPAIN 40 551 892 5,34 3,3 11,82 0,8 0 0,01 
Banca Popolare Commercio e Industria ITALY 16 326 954 9,05 7,75 15,88 0,83 0,01 0,01 
Source: own study based on Bankscope 
 
